Superform
FORGEDDeFi · Ethereum · Unknown TVL · 10 contracts
Public risk assessment — scores are produced with the same methodology as monitored protocols
Security Profile
42
48
52
35
55
40
25
60
50
30
55
42
48
52
35
55
40
25
60
50
30
55
Audit History
Bug Bounty Program
Assessment
Cross-chain yield aggregator with 17 validated findings (3 Critical, 8 High) from 6 parallel analysis lenses. F1 class (inspect/build gap) is systemic across hooks — 10 lens cross-confirmations. Pre-mainnet v2 with 6 prior audits that missed these surfaces. BRI lands at low FORGED (602) due to extreme compositional and cross-chain risk partially offset by standard supply chain and governance structures.
Dimension Breakdown
How scores work →- F1 class: inspect()-vs-build() systemic parameter binding gap across 6 hooks
- Manager can substitute critical calldata (dstChainId, recipient, lltv, outputAmount)
- 6 sub-findings (F1a-F1f) with validated PoCs — 10 lens hits across 4 agents
- F1a composes with ACK'd H-3.1.2 for SuperPosition supply inflation (Critical)
- Manager-as-strategist trust boundary is load-bearing with no on-chain enforcement
- F2: maxStaleness has no upper bound — manager sets type(uint256).max to disable PPS gate
- F3: updatePPSAfterSkim bypasses 14-property DOD oracle validation
- F4: cancel-redeem silently overridden by fulfill — manager captures optionality value
- PPS manipulation surfaces compose: F2+F3+Recon M-02 ACK'd PPS-sandwich
- F2: maxStaleness floor-only enforcement — no ceiling on oracle staleness
- F3: skim path bypasses validator-network DOD (sets lastUpdateTimestamp directly)
- F5: ECDSAPPSOracle uses abi.encodePacked instead of abi.encode for EIP-712
- Standard signers produce wrong digest — silent ProofValidationFailed events
- Multiple oracle-adjacent surfaces interact with PPS manipulation chain
- v2 not yet deployed to mainnet (Cantina bounty active, pre-launch)
- VaultBank still in test/draft — not yet promoted to src/
- High velocity of changes across 193-contract surface
- 6 prior audits (Spearbit, Recon, node.security, etc.) completed on earlier versions
- SuperGovernor exists but manager role is over-trusted
- maxStaleness floor-only enforcement (no ceiling — cosmology assumption #16)
- No on-chain slashing for manager misbehavior (cosmology assumption #12)
- Manager-as-strategist can keep staleness clock fresh without validator activity
- 6 prior audits (Spearbit, Recon, node.security, etc.) missed these findings
- 17 validated findings including 3 Critical-class with 10 validated PoCs
- F1 class (10 lens cross-confirmation) exploits pattern noted but not enumerated by Spearbit M-5.3.10
- F7 is dual surface of node.security M-01 fix — new bug introduced by prior remediation
- Very low adversarial resilience despite extensive prior review
- Extreme composition: hooks compose with cross-chain bridges (Across, DeBridge)
- External protocol integrations: Morpho, Ethena, Centrifuge, Pendle, Spectra, Fluid, Gearbox
- Internal SuperPosition system creates synthetic cross-chain positions
- F1 class directly exploits composition boundary between inspect() and build()
- 193 contracts across v2-core and v2-periphery
- Standard dependencies: OpenZeppelin, forge-std, solady
- No exotic or unaudited supply chain dependencies
- Substrate/Solidity mixed stack but standard patterns
- Moderate dependency complexity from multi-protocol integrations
- Cross-chain is CORE to SuperForm architecture — not optional
- F1a/F1e/F1f directly exploit cross-chain bridge hook calldata binding gaps
- Multiple bridge integrations: Across, DeBridge, Circle CCTP
- SuperPositions create synthetic cross-chain receipt tokens
- Bridge message replay and destination chain substitution surfaces validated
- Pre-mainnet: TVL not yet established for v2
- v1 had moderate TVL but v2 is a complete redesign
- Neutral score — insufficient on-chain data for liquidity assessment
- Standard multisig/team operational setup
- No specific opsec findings from sprint analysis
- Pre-mainnet reduces current operational attack surface
Additional Dimensions
- Not assessed — excluded from BRI computation
Risk Drivers
Primary risk factors driving this score, ordered by severity.
Adversarial Risk Signals
Observable security posture indicators. These signals reflect publicly verifiable information and responsible disclosure outcomes. No specific vulnerability details are exposed.
Score History & Verification
Score provenance tracking begins with the next reassessment.
On-Chain Data
- Protocol Slug
- "superform"
- Oracle
- BRORegistry (Base)
- Evidence
- IPFS (pinned)
- Staleness Threshold
- 24 hours
registry.getScore("superform")Reduce exploitable risk
BlackHart Monitoring provides continuous adversarial analysis, vulnerability detection, remediation support, and verified reassessment when your risk posture improves.